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Railroad Crossing Accidents in Louisiana
Louisiana does not impose strict liability in any form upon
railroads for damage arising from the collision of trains with
other vehicles at railroad crossings.' In order to establish railroad
liability for such damage, the victim of the accident must show
that the railroad was guilty of negligent conduct and that this
negligence was the proximate cause as well as the cause in fact
of the collision. 2 The mere occurrence of the accident raises no

presumption that the railroad was negligent.3
Negligence of the Railroad
Railroads are charged with maintaining every public crossing in a safe condition by keeping the view of the crossing free
of obstruction, by erecting the familiar stop signs, and, under
certain conditions, by providing special warning devices. Moreover, trains must be operated in accordance with certain speed
requirements and the operators of trains must sound specified
warning signals as the trains approach crossings. Recovery is
usually predicated upon the railroad's violation of one of these
duties.
Physical condition of the crossing. A railroad is required by
statute to construct the crossing so "as not to hinder, impede, or
obstruct its safe and convenient use."' 4 In collision cases, this
duty has played a prominent role only where the victim claimed
that his view of the crossing was unduly obstructed. The railroad's obligation to keep the view at crossings unobstructed requires affirmative action whenever it is necessary to render the
crossing safe for ordinary use by persons exercising reasonable
care. 5 Apparently, however, the railroads have had little diffi1. Lewis v. Thompson, 47 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. La. 1942); McClain v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 200 So. 57 (La. App. 1941); Bloxom v. Texas & Pac. Ry.,
15 La. App. 467, 131 So. 520 (1930); Washington v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 11 La.
App. 635, 124 So. 631 (1929).
2. Smith v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 189 So. 316 (La. App. 1939); Slayter v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 182 So. 343 (La. App. 1938). Cf. Henderson v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 15 La. App. 196, 131 So. 586 (1930).
3. Henwood v. Wallace, 159 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 820 (1947); Williams v. Thompson, 48 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. La. 1943);
Lewis v. Thompson, 47 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. La. 1942); McClain v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 200 So. 57 (La. App. 1941); Washington v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R.,
11 La. App. 635, 124 So. 631 (1929).
4. LA. R.S.

45:324

(1950).

5. Bahry v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 13 So.2d 78 (La. App. 1943); Homeland
Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 12 So.2d 62 (La. App. 1943).
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culty discharging this duty,6 and recoveries based on its violation
have been infrequent.
No obstruction to view at a crossing will result in railroad
liability if a driver operating a vehicle at a reasonable speed has
space in which to stop after clearing the obstruction. 7 Even if
obstructions to view make the crossing unsafe, the railroad may
escape liability by showing that its trainmen exercised special
care commensurate with the increased danger, as by reducing
speed or giving added warnings. 8 Moreover, even if the trainmen
have failed to exercise this additional care, the railroad might
successfully contend that such increased danger requires a
higher degree of care of those approaching the crossing.9 By
demanding this greater care of the public, the courts have gone
to seemingly unwarranted lengths. However, when conditions
at the crossing set a virtual "death trap" the courts tend to disregard plaintiff's failure to exercise this special care. 10
Stop signs. Railroads are required by statute to erect the
familiar "Louisiana Law Stop" signs at all public crossings."
Although failure to do so constitutes negligence, 12 one court has
refused to find negligence where, because of the physical conditions at the crossing, literal compliance with the provisions
regarding placement of signs was impracticable and the railroad
had in good faith tried to comply with the act.18
6. Stelly v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 49 So.2d 640 (La. App. 1950) (weeds not
tall enough to be obstruction); Hutchinson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 33 So.2d
139 (La. App. 1947) (view obscured by bushes and telephone poles up to 10
or 12 feet of the tracks); McClain v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 200 So. 57 (La. App.
1941) (maintenance of "passable" crossing not negligence); Banfleld v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 137 So. 571 (La. App. 1931) (at 25 feet from the crossing the driver could see 30 to 40 feet up the track; this was regarded as
an "ample opportunity to see a train"); Young v. Louisiana Western R.R.,
153 La. 129, 95 So. 511 (1923) (36 feet unobstructed view ample).
7. Perrin v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 140 La. 818, 74 So. 160 (1917).
8. Rachal v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 61 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1952); Smith v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 189 So. 316 (La. App. 1939), Wyatt v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R.,
13 La. App. 632, 127 So. 479 (1930).
9. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 55 So.2d 693 (La. App. 1951);
Allen v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 96 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. La. 1951); Stelly v. Texas
& N.O.R.R., 49 So.2d 640 (La. App. 1950); Teston v. Thompson, 77 F. Supp.

823 (W.D. La. 1948); Hutchinson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 33 So.2d 139 (La.
App. 1947); Lewis v. Thompson, 47 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. La. 1942); Perrin v.
New Orleans Terminal Co., 140 La. 818, 74 So. 160 (1917).
10. Draiss v. Payne, 158 La. 652, 658, 104 So. 487, 489 (1925) ("a railroad
company cannot be permitted to set a trap for the traveler"); cf. Williams
v. Thompson, 48 F. Supp. 760, 764 (W.D. La. 1943) ("so-called 'death trap'
doctrine").
11. LA. R.S. 45:562 (1950).

12. Grappe v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 16 La. App. 244, 133 So. 802 (1931).
13. Williams v. Thompson, 48 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. La. 1943).
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Wa'ning devices; The presence or absence of special warnings at the crossing, such as gates, flagmen, or automatic signals,
has been an important factor in determining railroad liability in
crossing accident cases. Proof of their presence and proper func14
tioning lends weight to a defense of contributory negligence.
No case of recovery from a railroad was found where these
warning devices were functioning properly. The railroads are
required to furnish such warnings only where local ordinances
so provide or where the location of the crossing and surrounding
conditions present extraordinary dangers. 15 Thus, these warnings
are not required at open country crossings in sparsely settled
rural areas 16 or at crossings where heavy traffic or dense population presents no unusual dangers. 17 On the other hand, when
heavily traveled crossings are especially hazardous, or when visibility is so poor as to conceal railroad signs, then the railroad's
failure to provide flagmen or warning signals may constitute
negligence.'
Since faster highway travel and congested traffic
conditions tend to increase the danger at grade crossings, it would
seem that failure to provide warning devices at crossings will
become a more frequent source of liability unless railroads take
steps to meet the increased dangers.
Once gates or automatic signals have been provided at a
crossing, failure to maintain them in proper working order is
clearly negligence.' 9 The public has learned to rely on these
warning signals; consequently, the courts have dealt lightly with
the defense of contributory negligence where plaintiff has been
20
deceived by his reliance on a faulty signal.
14. Teston v. Thompson, 77 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. La. 1948); Levy v. New
Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945).
15. Eggleston v. La. & Ark. Ry., 192 So. 774 (La. App. 1939); Natal v, La.
& Ark. Ry., 18 La. App. 50, 137 So. 600 (1931); Washington v. Yazoo &
M.V.R.R., 11 La. App. 635, 124 So. 631 (1929); Smith v. La. & Ark. Ry., 10 La.
App. 502, 120 So. 669 (1929). Although it is not a settled point of law, there

is authority for the admissibility of the safety history (or evidence of dangerous nature) of a crossing in proving its dangerous condition and the railroad's knowledge thereof. Jones v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 154 So. 768 (La. App.
1934); ef. Rachal v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 61 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1952). See Lee,
Proof of Safety History in Railroad Crossing Accidents, 28 TEXAS L. Rv.

76-89 (1949). See also Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61
HARV. L. REV. 205 (1948).
16. Alanza v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 32 So.2d 341 (La. App. 1947); Williams
v. Thompson, 48 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. La. 1943).
17. Eggleston v. La. & Ark. Ry., 192 So. 774 (La. App. 1939).
18. Martin v. Yazoo & M.R.R., 181 So. 571 (La. App. 1938).
19. McLellan v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 127 So. 648 (La. App. 1930)
(gates broken); Dardenne v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 127 So. 458 (La. App. 1930)
(wig-wag signal broken); Clements v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 148 La. 1050, 88 So.
394 (1921) (gates broken).
20. McLellan v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 127 So. 648 (La. App. 1930)
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Speed of the train. The plaintiff in crossing accident cases
frequently seeks to establish the negligence of the railroad by
showing that the train was operated at an unreasonable speed
at the time of the accident. An efficient transportation system
demands swift rail travel; consequently, negligence is not inferred from the speed at which a train is operated in open
country so long as the speed is consistent with the train's own
safety. 21 Trainmen are therefore not required to reduce the
speed of the train at rural crossings.2 2 Moreover, although trainmen must take safety precautions commensurate with the dangerous character of each crossing, 23 they need not maintain a speed
enabling them to stop within the range of their vision,24 as
drivers of automobiles are required to do. Thus, trains may be
operated at normal speeds when visibility is poor, as, for in25
stance, under rainy or foggy weather conditions.
The peculiar facts of each case govern the determination
of whether or not the speed at which a train was operated makes
the railroad guilty of negligence. The violation of local speed
ordinances clearly constitutes negligence, 26 as does the infraction of the railroad's own speed regulations when established
27
in the interest of safety.
In order to recover, plaintiff must show, not only that train(raising of gates considered "invitation to cross"); Clements v. Texas & Pac.
Ry., 148 La. 1050, 88 So. 394 (1921). But cf. Dardenne v. Texas & Pac. Ry.,
127 So. 458 (La. App. 1930). The provisions of LA. R.S. 45:563 (1950), requiring a driver to stop within 10 to 50 feet of a crossing, are not applicable
where the crossing is provided with gates or flagmen. The Dardenne case
held that wig-wag signals do not come within this exemption. In this case
the driver was held contributorily negligent notwithstanding the broken
signal. Under this decision the failure of the wig-wag to operate does not
constitute an "invitation to proceed."
21. Guidry v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 56 So.2d 611 (La. App. 1952); Winflele v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 150 So. 43 (La. App. 1933); Jeter v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 149
So. 144 (La. App. 1933); Franklin v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 10 La. App. 526,
120 So. 679 (1929); accord: Moody v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 37 So.2d 346 (La. App.
1948).
22. Guidry v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 20 So.2d 637 (La. App. 1945); Winflele v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 150 So. 43 (La. App. 1933); Franklin v. Louisiana & Ark.
Ry., 10 La. App. 526, 120 So. 679 (1929).
23. Rachal v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 61 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1952); Smith v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 189 So. 316 (La. App. 1939); Wyatt v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R.,
13 La. App. 632, 127 So. 479 (1930).
24. Homeland Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 12 So.2d 62 (La. App. 1943); Jeter v.
Texas & Pac. R.R., 149 So. 144 (La. App. 1933); cf. Cruse v. Thompson, 36
So.2d 735 (La. App. 1948).
25. Homeland Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 12 So.2d 62 (La. App. 1943); Jeter v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 149 So. 144 (La. App. 1933).
26. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Aucoin, 195 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1952); Broussard
v. Louisiana Western R.R., 140 La. 517, 73 So. 606 (1916).
27. Levy v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945); Broussard v. Louisiana Western R.R., 140 La. 517, 73 So. 606 (1916).
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men maintained excessive speeds, but also that the excessive
28
speed was at least a contributing cause of the crossing accident.
The difficulty of finding this causal relationship was aptly expressed in Levy v. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R.29 : "Had
the speed of the train not exceeded the limit fixed by the rules,
who can say that the accident might not have been averted?"
Where the jury is employed, the question of cause is for them to
determine.
The sounding of bells, whistles, and horns. Railroads are
under a statutory duty to provide each locomotive with a bell
and either a whistle or horn "which, under normal conditions,
can be heard at a distance of three hundred yards. . . ."30 Trainmen must ring the bell and sound the whistle or horn in a specified manner at a distance of three hundred yards from the
crossing and continue the signals until the crossing is reached. 3'
The courts have regarded the statutory distance as a minimum
safety standard and have required that the signals be given
within an effective distance in all cases, even if this distance
exceeds the prescribed three hundred yards.3 2 Although both
signals need not be sounded together, one or the other must
be sounded continuously. 33 Violation of this statutory duty has
35
34
been called negligence per se and gross negligence.
The most difficult problem arising under this statute is one
of proof. The victim and his witnesses almost invariably deny
having heard the signal and the trainmen "swear to the statute."
Moreover, persons living in the vicinity of railroad crossings are
so accustomed to the sounds of train signals that they may fail
to notice them. Their testimony is therefore regarded as having
little value in establishing that a warning signal was not given "
28. Alanza v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 32 So.2d 341 (La. App. 1947).
29. 20 So.2d 559, 564 (La. App. 1945).
30. LA. R.S. 45:561 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 395.

The

amendment does not change the substance of the duty existing previously
under La. Acts 1924, No. 12, § 1, p. 16.
31. LA. R.S. 45:561 (1950).
32. Smith v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 189 So. 316 (La. App. 1939).
33. Wright v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 19 So.2d 894 (La. App. 1944), rehearing
denied, 20 So.2d 558 (La. App. 1945).
34. Smith v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 189 So. 316 (La. App. 1939); Henderson v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 15 La. App. 196, 131 So. 586 (1930).
35. Guidry v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 20 So.2d 637 (La. App. 1945).
36. Hutchinson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 33 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1947); Handy
v. New Orleans Public Service, 10 La. App. 72, 120 So. 271 (1929); Bihm v.

New Orleans & Mexico R.R., 6 La. App. 655 (1927).
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but is accorded greater weight when used to establish that the
3T
signal was given.
Contributory Negligence
The degree of care which a driver of a vehicle must exercise when approaching a crossing is set forth in two statutes
relating to the duty to "stop, look, and listen." Louisiana Revised
Statutes 45:563, which re-enacts a 1924 statute,38 provides that
violation of the duty to stop, look, and listen at railroad crossings "shall not affect recovery for damages and the question
of negligence or violation shall be left to the jury." The other
statute, R.S. 32:243, requires the driver of an automobile at a
crossing to stop "at such a place, in such manner and for a
sufficient period of time to enable the driver . . . to observe
the approach of trains . . . by looking . . . and by listening . . .
before proceeding. . . " It further provides that if drivers find
compliance impossible, then they "shall proceed only with the
greatest caution and at their peril." (Italics supplied.) The
latter provision strongly suggests a legislative purpose of relieving railroads of all liability in crossing collision cases. However,
in Robertson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. (1936)3 9 the court held that
the 1932 act 40 from which this provision is derived was merely
declarative of the law as it existed under the 1924 act. This
decision has been consistently followed; yet there exists considerable support for the contrary view. In 1927, the Supreme
Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
prescribed a standard of care requiring a driver to "get out of
his vehicle" if it is otherwise impossible to ascertain the approach
of a train.41 Apparently in response to this famous decision,
the Louisiana legislature enacted the statute of 1932 and adopted
almost verbatim the standard announced by Mr. Justice Holmesdrivers who do not stop, proceed "at their peril." The refusal
of the courts to give effect to the clear purpose of the statute
would seem to indicate a desire on their part to protect the
public from the hazards created by railway transportation. This
refusal has left the standard of care required of drivers to be
determined by the 1924 act, incorporated in R.S. 45:563.
37. Bloxom v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 15 La. App. 467, 131 So. 520 (1930);

Handy v. New Orleans Public Service, 10 La. App. 72, 120 So. 271 (1929).
38. La. Acts 1924, No. 12, p. 16.
39. 165 So. 527, 530 (La. App. 1936); accord: Henwood v. Wallace, 159
F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1947).
40. La. Acts 1932, No. 21, p. 162, substantially re-enacted by La. Acts
1938, No. 286, p. 708.
41. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
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Contributory negligence presents a particularly difficult
question in crossing accident cases, because the reasonableness
of plaintiff's conduct depends largely upon the conduct of the
railroad's employees. For example, the care required of the
driver of an automobile approaching a crossing varies with the
presence or absence at the crossing of automatic signals, gates,
or watchmen.4 2 The driver's duty is also affected by his familiar43
Simiity with the crossing and his knowledge of its dangers.
larly, the care required of the driver increases with the difficulty
44
of seeing or hearing approaching trains.
Usually, the momentum of a moving train is too great for
it to stop in the few moments between the time at which a
careful trainman could appreciate plaintiff's peril and the time
of the train's arrival at the crossing.45 For this reason, plaintiffs
have had little success invoking the doctrine of last clear chance
against a defense of contributory negligence in crossing collision
cases.
J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.

Substantive Due Process of Law and Civil Liberties
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has
seemed increasingly willing to accord state legislation in the field
of civil liberties the same presumption of validity enjoyed by
state economic regulation.
Until the early 1930's, the Court frequently considered state
legislation regulating business activity repugnant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance,
state regulation of prices charged by businesses not "affected
with a public interest" was regarded as depriving persons engaged
in such businesses of their property without due process of law.1
42. Levy v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945).
43. Stelly v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 49 So.2d 640 (La. App. 1950); Butler v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 46 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La. 1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d 492
(5th Cir. 1944); accord, O'Connor v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 40 So.2d 663 (La.
App. 1949); Ashy v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 186 So. 395 (La. App. 1939).
44. See note 9 supra.
45. Matthews v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 45 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1950);
Teston v. Thompson, 77 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. La. 1948); Levy v. New Orleans
& N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945); McClain v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 200
So. 57 (La. App. 1941); Washington v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 11 La. App. 635,
124 So. 631 (1929).
1. See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bros. v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).

